Hitler's American Gamble

September 15, 2021
A meticulous historical account of "five momentous days" at the beginning of World War II. Congress declared war on Japan the day after the Dec. 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor, but it didn't declare war on Germany. That was Hitler's idea, and he declared war on the U.S. on Dec. 11. Most historians argue that this was a terrible decision, but Hitler showed no doubt. Simms and Laderman deliver an insightful account of those five days. As the authors note, few considered Japan a serious military threat, and most experts believed that it had bombed Pearl Harbor at Hitler's behest. Franklin Roosevelt and Allied leaders continued to consider Germany the major threat. Yet when Roosevelt's Cabinet met and Secretary of War Henry Stimson urged a declaration of war against Germany, no one supported him, and Roosevelt did not mention Germany in his famous "day of infamy" speech. Always attuned to public opinion, he deferred to powerful opposition to another European war, as embodied by the America First Committee, which had grumpily agreed to fight only Japan. Many histories report that Churchill "slept the sleep of the saved and thankful" after hearing the news of Pearl Harbor. That's hindsight, write Simms and Laderman, noting how he documented that sentiment later. At the time in Britain, "opinion was split on whether the new Pacific war was good or bad news." Many, Churchill included, worried that the U.S. would focus on Japan and leave Britain to face Hitler alone--a realistic concern given that the U.S. had immediately suspended its massive lend-lease program. Hitler's declaration of war solved the problem, and the authors conclude that he did not declare war in ignorance of America's immense power but because of it. "In late 1941," they write, "the F�hrer saw a narrow window of opportunity not to defeat the United States outright but to create a self-sufficient Axis bloc strong enough to withstand it. Otherwise he risked gradual strangulation." An excellent argument that America's WWII began on Dec. 11, 1941.

COPYRIGHT(2021) Kirkus Reviews, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

October 11, 2021
Historians Simms (Europe) and Laderman (Sharing the Burden) focus in this fine-grained if plodding chronicle on the four days between the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Nazi Germany’s declaration of war against the U.S. They contend that America’s lend-lease program, which supplied allied countries with food, oil, and weaponry, brought the country to the edge of outright conflict, despite public sentiment in favor of isolationism, and helped provoke the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. Following the attack, the public was eager to declare war on Japan, but President Roosevelt faced an uphill battle in convincing people to enter another European war. According to the authors, Hitler, who believed that the Japanese attack would put an end to the lend-lease supplies fueling the British and Russian war efforts and weaken the American military, made a grave strategic blunder in declaring war on the U.S. on Dec. 11, 1941. In so doing, he “turn two potentially separate conflicts into a truly world war.” Though Simms and Laderman take a fresh angle on the buildup to WWII, they overstuff the story with extraneous details and deep dives into diplomatic maneuverings. This one is best suited to completists.

Starred review from November 1, 2021

Conventional wisdom holds that once the Japanese Empire bombed Pearl Harbor in 1941, American entry into World War II was inevitable. However, in the five days between the Pearl Harbor attack and Hitler's declaration of war on the U.S., there was much uncertainty. Simms (history of international relations, Univ. of Cambridge; Europe and Hitler) and Laderman (international history, King's Coll., London; Sharing the Burden) argue that the United States might not have entered the war in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, had Hitler not declared war on the nation on December 11, 1941 (thus keeping Germany's promise to Japan). Simms and Laderman reason that the nation was still in shock at the attack; American isolationist sentiment was still strong, at least as regarded Europe; and, with congressional backing uncertain, FDR had been unwilling to ask Congress for a declaration of war against Italy and Germany. The authors provide an hour-by-hour account of December 7 to December 12, 1941, including the events of the war in Europe, and delve into American public sentiment and the sentiment of the press to illustrate the uncertainty that still existed between December 7 and 12. VERDICT The authors effectively prove their thesis in a key volume for World War II history collections.--Michael Farrell, Reformed Theological Seminary, Orlando, FL

Copyright 2021 Library Journal, LLC Used with permission.